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REVIEW OF INITIATIVES BY THE 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, 2000–2010 
Gerald F. Uelmen* 
The single-subject rule has been part of the California Constitution 
since 1948. However, the California Supreme Court had never declared 
that an initiative violated this requirement until Senate of California v. 
Jones in 1999. This ruling seemed to suggest that the court would 
control the ambitions of the fourth branch of government—initiative 
drafters. Since Jones, the California Supreme Court, in six different 
cases, has examined initiatives for compliance with the single-subject 
rule and the prohibition on constitutional revisions. By reviewing all six 
of these cases, this Article explains that the original hope of Jones’s 
impact on initiatives was a mere fantasy because the single-subject rule 
and prohibition on constitutional revisions have again been reduced to 
historical artifacts. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., Loyola Marymount 
University; J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. 
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At the turn of the millennium, in a fit of pre-9/11 optimism, I 
greeted the California Supreme Court’s decision in Senate of 
California v. Jones 1 as a harbinger of welcome and long-overdue 
change. 2 Although the “single-subject” requirement hasd been part of 
the California Constitution since 1948,3 Jones was the first 
California Supreme Court decision to declare that an initiative 
measure violated that requirement, forcing its removal from the 
ballot even though the necessary signatures to qualify it had been 
collected.4 The decision invalidated the Let the Voters Decide Act of 
2000, which would have amended the California Constitution to 
reduce legislative salaries, mandated voter approval of any increases, 
and required the California Supreme Court to adopt plans for the 
decennial reapportionment of legislative and congressional districts.5 
The conclusion that I authored in a 2001 article conjured up visions 
of George W. Bush standing on the deck of the USS Abraham 
Lincoln declaring “Mission Accomplished.” I declared: 
The California Supreme Court decision in Jones should 
send a strong message to the industry that drafts and 
promotes initiative measures as California’s “fourth 
branch” of government. The door has been opened to 
greater use of pre-election review of procedural challenges 
to initiatives, lowering the threshold from the previously 
required “clear showing” of invalidity to a “strong 
likelihood” of invalidity. The requirement that initiatives 
embrace a single subject has finally grown some teeth 
because of the court’s willingness to look beyond the 
language of the initiative itself to extraneous evidence of 
“logrolling,” and due to the analysis of the potential for 
voter confusion or deception that closely resembles the 
“public understanding” test . . . . 
 While Jones avoided the question of whether the 
initiative at issue was a constitutional revision, there are 
compelling reasons to give this question the same access to 
 
 1. 988 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1999). 
 2. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives 
After Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1000, 1010 (2001). 
 3. Id. at 999; see CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). 
 4. See Uelmen, supra note 2, at 999. 
 5. Id. at 1004. 
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pre-election review as the single-subject question, and to 
enforce it with similar vigor. 6 
This Article briefly reviews the California Supreme Court decisions 
since Jones that have addressed this issue to demonstrate the extent 
to which I was fantasizing when I looked to the court to control the 
ambitions of our fourth branch of government. The single-subject 
rule and the prohibition of constitutional revision through initiatives 
have again been reduced to historical artifacts, and the pre-election 
review of initiatives has been severely limited. In the eleven years 
since Senate v. Jones, the California Supreme Court has addressed 
the appropriateness of pre-election review or examined initiatives for 
compliance with the single-subject rule or the prohibition of 
constitutional revision through initiatives six times. 
1.  Manduley v. Superior Court 7 
In this case, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 
21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, 
after voters approved it.8 A strong single-subject challenge was 
presented; it focused on the inclusion of amendments greatly 
expanding the Three Strikes law to include a number of offenses that 
had nothing to do with gang violence or juvenile crime.9 Proposition 
21 “broadened the circumstances in which prosecutors are authorized 
to file charges against minors 14 years of age and older in the 
criminal division of the superior court, rather than in the juvenile . . . 
court.” 10 Relying on the approach enumerated in Jones, the plaintiffs 
argued that there was no public understanding of the breadth of 
Proposition 21’s provisions. 11 The majority opinion by Chief Justice 
George 12 rejected that argument, finding one line in the legislative 
analyst’s analysis and one in the attorney general’s official summary 
mentioning that the initiative “designates additional crimes as violent 
 
 6. Id. at 1024–25. 
 7. 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002). 
 8. Id. at 8–9. 
 9. See id. at 27–28. 
 10. Id. at 38 (Moreno, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. at 31 n.12 (majority opinion) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the initiative 
constituted an instance of “logrolling,” or combining in a single measure several unrelated 
provisions that might not have garnered majority support if considered separately). 
 12. Id. at 8. 
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and serious felonies . . . .” 13 He wrote, “We must assume the voters 
duly considered and comprehended these materials.” 14 Justice 
Moreno, however, responded in a concurring opinion that should 
have been labeled a dissent. He wrote: 
[W]hile it is to be hoped that voters carefully study their 
ballot guides, the realistic premise behind the single-subject 
rule is that many voters do not, and the ballot measures 
should be simple enough to be fairly well described in the 
title and summary. The less rigorously we enforce the 
single-subject rule, the more we are compelled to rely on 
implausible assumptions about voters’ understanding of a 
ballot measure’s intricacies. 
 This lack of notice to voters is especially troublesome 
because the Three Strikes law is itself a substantial and 
controversial piece of legislation, the amendment of which 
merits the careful attention of the voters. 15 
2.  Costa v. Superior Court 16 
In this case, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, granted a pre-election review of Proposition 77, one of 
several reapportionment schemes that have proposed using retired 
judges to draw the boundaries. 17 After examining Proposition 77, the 
court removed it from the ballot on the ground that there were 
discrepancies between the version circulated to the voters and the 
version submitted to the attorney general for the ballot. 18  
The California Supreme Court reversed and ordered the 
initiative placed on the ballot, finding that the discrepancies were 
minor and inadvertent. 19 The court also noted that people do not read 
an initiative measure before they sign a petition anyway, so no one 
was fooled. 20 The voters defeated the measure, and although that 
rendered the case moot, the supreme court wrote an opinion to 
 
 13. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 14. Id. at 32 (quoting Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal. 1990)). 
 15. Id. at 39 (Moreno, J., concurring). 
 16. 128 P.3d 675 (Cal. 2006). 
 17. Id. at 681–82. 
 18. Id. at 683. 
 19. Id. at 696–97. 
 20. See id. at 699. 
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further explain its pre-election ruling. 21 That opinion declared that 
although the court of appeal was wrong on the merits, it was correct 
to grant a pre-election review. The supreme court declared: 
[B]ecause the question at issue in such a case is whether the 
initiative measure has satisfied the constitutional or 
statutory procedural prerequisites necessary to qualify it for 
the ballot, it is logical and appropriate for a court to 
consider such a claim prior to the election, because if the 
threshold procedural prerequisites have not been satisfied 
the measure is not entitled to be submitted to the voters. 
Unlike a challenge to the substantive validity of a proposed 
measure, it cannot properly be suggested that it would be 
premature to consider such a claim prior to the election, 
because the focus of the issue is solely upon whether the 
measure has qualified for the ballot, and not upon the 
validity or invalidity of the measure were it to be approved 
by the voters. 22 
Costa was a 4–3 decision authored by Chief Justice George, 23 and 
the majority included a justice of the court of appeal sitting by 
designation. 24 Justices Kennard and Moreno dissented on the ground 
that any variation between the language circulated for signature and 
the language submitted to the attorney general should invalidate the 
initiative 25 without the court inquiring whether the difference was 
minor or major. Justice Werdegar dissented on the ground that the 
supreme court should not render opinions in cases that are moot. 26 
3.  Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson 27 
While this case did not directly involve a popular initiative, it 
did involve a constitutional requirement analogous to the single-
subject rule. 28 When the legislature refers constitutional amendments 
to the people for a vote, the California Constitution requires that 
 
 21. Id. at 684. 
 22. Id. at 685. 
 23. Id. at 675–76. 
 24. Id. at 702. 
 25. See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 26. See id. at 708 (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 27. 134 P.3d 299 (Cal. 2006). 
 28. Id. 
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“[e]ach amendment shall be so prepared and submitted that it can be 
voted on separately.” 29 In this case, the legislature designed its 
proposed amendments to subvert a popular initiative that had 
qualified for the ballot that would require open primaries. 30 The 
legislature proposed an alternative, more restrictive open primary 
combined with a measure to accelerate bond repayments. 31 The bond 
measure was calculated to make the voters think that the measure 
would “save them millions of dollars.” 32 
Once again, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, invalidated the measure on a pre-election review, but instead 
of withdrawing it from the ballot entirely, the court fashioned a 
remedy of bifurcation, requiring the two amendments to be submitted 
to the voters separately. 33 After the voters adopted both measures, the 
California Supreme Court granted review and vacated the court of 
appeal’s judgment. 34 Holding that the separate-vote requirement 
should be construed consistent with the single-subject rule, the 
supreme court agreed that the two amendments violated the rule, but 
that there was no constitutional authority for the bifurcation remedy 
that the court of appeal fashioned. 35 Then, although the measures had 
been submitted to the voters in violation of the constitution, the court 
concluded it would be inappropriate to invalidate them since the 
voters had separately approved them. 36 By eliminating the remedy of 
bifurcation for single-subject violations, however, the court upped 
the ante for pre-election review of single-subject challenges. 
4.  Independent Energy Producers Association v. McPherson 37 
Proposition 80 was fashioned in the wake of California’s 
electricity meltdown, which was widely blamed on deregulation. 38 
The proposition would have granted extensive new powers to the 
 
 29. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. 
 30. Californians for an Open Primary, 134 P.3d at 301. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 301 n.3. 
 33. Id. at 301. 
 34. Id. at 331. 
 35. See id. at 330. 
 36. Id. at 331. 
 37. 136 P.3d 178 (Cal. 2006). 
 38. See id. at 182. 
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Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to regulate energy producers. 39 
The Independent Energy Producers Association brought suit to 
invalidate the measure on the ground that the California Constitution 
grants “plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this 
constitution” 40 to the legislature to grant additional powers to the 
PUC. 41 The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, 
granted pre-election review, reasoning that the challenge was not to 
the measure’s substantive terms but to whether the initiative’s 
procedural device was even available to do what Proposition 80 
proposed. 42 The court of appeal ruled “Proposition 80 is 
unquestionably invalid on its face because . . . it runs afoul of a plain 
and unambiguous provision of our state Constitution . . . that 
effectively precludes use of the initiative process to accomplish what 
Proposition 80 proposes to do.” 43 The court concluded that 
“preelection review is proper, indeed essential.” 44 
The California Supreme Court reversed, restoring the measure to 
the ballot. 45 Proposition 80 was defeated. 46 Then, as in Costa, the 
court issued an opinion after the election despite the case being 
moot. 47 Unlike in Costa, however, the court held that pre-election 
review was not appropriate. 48 While Chief Justice George authored 49 
a persuasive opinion grounded in legislative history, he also 
distinguished much of the language in Jones that encouraged pre-
trial review of initiatives. 50 Chief Justice George said that the 
language granting plenary authority to the legislature was not 
intended to deny that power to the initiative process. 51 He wrote: 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 180 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 182–83. 
 43. Id. at 183.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Lynda Gledhill, Attempt to Restore Regulation of Utilities Fails to Generate Voters’ 
Support, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2005, at A17, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-11-
09/news/17399129_1_energy-policy-energy-giants-independent-energy-producers. 
 47. Indep. Energy, 136 P.3d at 180. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 179. 
 50. Id. at 184–85. 
 51. See id. at 188. 
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[A] contention that an initiative measure is invalid because 
the measure cannot lawfully be enacted through the 
initiative process is a type of claim that generally will not 
become moot if the initiative is approved by the voters at 
the election. Because this type of claim is potentially 
susceptible to resolution either before or after an election, 
there is good reason for a court to be even more cautious 
than when it is presented with the type of procedural claim 
at issue in Costa before deciding that it is appropriate to 
resolve such a claim prior to an election rather than wait 
until after the election. Of course, as this court noted in 
Senate v. Jones, potential costs are incurred in postponing 
the judicial resolution of a challenge to an initiative 
measure until after the measure has been submitted to and 
approved by the voters, and such costs appropriately can be 
considered by a court in determining the propriety of 
preelection intervention. Nonetheless, because this type of 
challenge is one that can be raised and resolved after an 
election, deferring judicial resolution until after the 
election—when there will be more time for full briefing and 
deliberation—often will be the wiser course. 52 
This language, of course, does not bode well for pre-election review 
regarding the claim that an initiative undertakes a constitutional 
revision. 
5.  Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil 53 
This case is difficult to reconcile with Independent Energy, 
although the California Supreme Court decided the two cases only 
thirty-five days apart. 54 Here, in a pre-election review, the California 
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, invalidated a San 
Bernardino County initiative that would have required voter approval 
for future increases in water rates. 55 The supreme court agreed, 
reasoning that although voters had the power to lower water rates by 
initiative, the Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency’s Board’s attempt 
to limit future increases violated the exclusive delegation rule, which 
 
 52. Id. at 184–85 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 53. 138 P.3d 220 (Cal. 2006). 
 54. Id. at 220; Indep. Energy, 136 P.3d at 178. 
 55. Verjil, 138 P.3d at 222–23. 
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bars initiative measures that infringe on the power of the agency’s 
governing board to set its water-delivery rates and charges. 56 In 
addressing the appropriateness of pre-election review, however, 
Justice Kennard’s unanimous opinion 57 simply asserted, 
When a significant part of a proposed initiative measure is 
invalid, the measure may not be submitted to the voters. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the 
initiative could not be placed on the ballot, and it properly 
granted judgment for the Agency, and the Court of Appeal 
correctly affirmed the trial court’s judgment, although its 
reasoning differed substantially from the reasoning we use 
here. 58 
There is no mention of Chief Justice George’s opinion in 
Independent Energy, which Justice Kennard had joined. 59 
6.  Strauss v. Horton 60 
This ruling is well known to everyone because it upheld 
Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to overrule 
the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, 61 
and because it again outlawed gay marriages in California. What is 
not widely appreciated, however, is the Strauss opinion’s narrowing 
of the arguments available to challenge an initiative measure seeking 
to revise the constitution. Chief Justice George rejected the argument 
that an initiative depriving citizens of a fundamental right is a 
constitutional revision. The chief justice concluded that only a 
measure that makes “far reaching changes in the nature of our basic 
governmental plan” 62 or “substantially alter[s] the basic 
governmental framework set forth in our Constitution” can qualify as 
a constitutional revision. 63 In her concurring opinion, Justice 
Werdegar correctly asserted, “[t]his is wrong.” 64 She explained: 
 
 56. Id. at 230. 
 57. Id. at 221 
 58. Id. at 230. 
 59. Indep. Energy, 136 P.3d at 194. 
 60. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 61. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 62. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 98 (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 223 (1978)). 
 63. Id. at 98 (quoting Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1319 (Cal. 1991)). 
 64. Id. at 124 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
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In fact, until today the court has gone only so far as to say 
that a “qualitative revision includes one that involves a 
change in the basic plan of California government, i.e., a 
change in its fundamental structure or the foundational 
powers of its branches. 65 . . . Today, the majority changes 
“includes” to “is,” thus foreclosing other possibilities. 66 
 At oral argument, Justice Moreno asked whether repealing the 
equal protection clause of the California Constitution would be a 
constitutional revision. 67 Counsel for the interveners responded that a 
simple majority could amend the state constitution by initiative to 
eliminate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 68 In his 
passionate dissent in Strauss, Justice Moreno concluded that: 
[R]equiring discrimination against a minority group on the 
basis of a suspect classification strikes at the core of the 
promise of equality that underlies our California 
Constitution and thus represents such a drastic and far-
reaching change in the nature and operation of our 
governmental structure that it must be considered a 
‘revision’ of the state constitution . . . . 69 
The problem with this argument is that In re Marriage Cases had just 
created the fundamental protection that Justice Moreno extolled. 
Thus, Justice Moreno seemed to be saying that the California 
Supreme Court can revise the constitution, but the legislature or the 
people cannot unless they convene a constitutional convention. 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing the summation of these six cases, it is readily 
apparent that Jones was not a harbinger of change, but was instead a 
hiccup of sorts, probably inspired by the California Supreme Court’s 
distaste for taking on the job of redistricting. Pre-election review is 
again a matter of judicial grace, with no consistency in how it is 
dispensed. Manduley restored the single-subject rule to its 
amorphous, ineffective past. 70 A claim that a measure works as a 
 
 65. Id. at 124–25 (quoting Eu, 816 P.2d at 1318). 
 66. Id. at 125. 
 67. See id. at 138 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70. See Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 32 (Cal. 2002). 
  
Winter 2011] INITIATIVE REVIEWS 669 
constitutional revision has been taken off the table for pre-election 
review and has been severely restricted by Chief Justice George’s 
sleight of hand in Strauss. 
I find it quite ironic that the chief justice has often been heard to 
bemoan the abuse of California’s initiative process. When inducted 
into the American Academy of Arts and Sciences last year in Boston, 
he used the occasion to address “the perils of direct democracy.” 71 
He posed this rhetorical question, with little mystery as to how he 
would answer it: 
A student of government might reasonably ask: Does the 
voter Initiative . . . remain a positive contribution in the 
form in which it now exists in 21st century California? Or, 
despite its original objective—to curtail special interests . . . 
has the voter Initiative now become the tool of the very 
types of special interests it was intended to control, and an 
impediment to the effective functioning of a true 
democratic process? 72 
I would pose another rhetorical question for the chief justice: To 
what extent does the unbridled power of the initiative in twenty-first 
century California reflect the California Supreme Court’s failure to 
enforce the constitutional limits on its use? 
To conclude, I would like to return to a metaphor I first 
employed while greeting Jones as our potential savior: 
The initiative has thus become a fourth branch of 
government, with its own industrial complex available to 
draft and qualify measures on a recurring basis. Like the 
carnivorous plant in the movie Little Shop of Horrors, 73 the 
initiative industry opens its mouth in anticipation of every 
election, says, “feed me!” and then grows larger. Each time 
Californians go to the polls, they expect to encounter a 
dozen ballot propositions, to determine questions as basic 
as who should go to jail, who should be executed, who 
 
 71. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, Induction Ceremony at the 
American Academy of Arts & Sciences: The Perils of Direct Democracy: The California 
Experience 7–9 (Oct. 10, 2009), available at http://www.amacad.org/publications/bulletin/ 
winter2010/ceremony.pdf. 
 72. Id. at 9. 
 73. LITTLE SHOP OF HORRORS (Warner Bros. 1986). 
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should pay taxes and how much they should pay, and who 
can marry whom. 74 
In November 2010, we rejected proposals to legalize marijuana, 75 
junk the reform of redistricting now underway, 76 repeal the Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 77 and fund state parks with a 
vehicle-registration surcharge. 78 We approved a proposal to allow the 
legislature to enact a budget with a simple majority. 79 Some of these 
are good ideas; some are bad. The problem with deciding which are 
which by the initiative process is that the enactment of an initiative, 
and often the defeat, takes the issue off the legislative table. Our 
ability to regulate and fine-tune the application of any changes is 
eliminated. The only way we can amend an initiative is with another 
initiative. 80 
 
 74. Uelmen, supra note 2, at 999–1000. 
 75. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER 
INFORMATION GUIDE 92 (2010), available at 
http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/complete-vig.pdf (providing the proposed text 
of Proposition 19). 
 76. Id. at 115 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 27). 
 77. See id. at 106 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 23). 
 78. Id. at 97 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 21). 
 79. Id. at 113 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 25). 
 80. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186 (Cal. 2010). 
